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A b s t r a c t  
In recent years, interorganizational relationship management has become of paramount interest in marketing channels 
research. Marketing managers and researchers have identified mutual commitment among exchange partners in a marketing 
channel as central to successful relationship marketing and as key to producing significant benefits for firms. We consider 
two types of commitment that may characterize interfirm relationships, Affective commitment expresses the extent to which 
channel members like to maintain their relationship with specific partners. Calculative commitment measures the degree to 
which channel members experience the need  to maintain a relationship. After conceptualizing commitment, we offer a set of 
hypotheses concerning the joint impact of trust and interdependence on both affective and calculative commitment. Testing 
our hypotheses in a field study involving two countries, we find strong evidence that total interdependence enhances both 
affective and calculative commitment. Which type of commitment develops depends on trust. The unexpected positive effect 
of interdependence asymmetry on affective commitment seems to be in line with a stream of research that has emphasized 
the positive role of power differences in promoting the effective coordination of channel relationships. 
Keywords: Marketing channels; Commitment: Trust: Interdependence: Cross-national 
1.  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Relationship commitment has recently emerged in 
the marketing channels literature as a critically im- 
portant element for channel survival (e.g., Anderson 
and Weitz, 1992; Morgan and Hunt, 1994) and per- 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: (32) 16 326956: fax: (32) 16 
326732. 
formance (Kumar e t a ! . ,  1994; Noordewier et al., 
1990). Channel member commitment connotes soli- 
darity and cohesion (Dwyer et al., 1987), encourag- 
ing the channel partner firms to resist apparently 
attractive short-term alternatives in favor of the ex- 
pected long-term benefits of staying with existing 
partners (Anderson et al., 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 
1994). 
The recognition that commitment is central to 
successful relationship marketing has triggered re- 
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search on the factors that contribute to developing, 
maintaining and increasing commitment. Recent 
studies suggest that both structural elements of the 
channel relationship and channel firm attitudes can 
impact relationship commitment. We focus on one 
structural element, the channel interdependence 
structure, and one attitudinal factor, trust in one's 
channel partner, that have been identified as having 
an impact on commitment, Whereas considerable 
evidence indicates that trust positively affects com- 
mitment (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994), the effects of channel firm interdepen- 
dence on commitment are less clear, in part because 
different researchers have examined different aspects 
of channel firm dependence or interdependence. 
In this paper, we argue that the effects of trust and 
interdependence on relationship commitment are 
more complex than revealed by previous findings. 
First, although recent social science research has 
found commitment to be a multi-faceted construct 
(e.g., Allen and Meyer, 1991; Mathieu and Zajac, 
1990), channel studies have almost exclusively fo- 
cused on a more affective kind of commitment, 
neglecting a second, more instrumental type of com- 
mitment, viz. calculative commitment. Recognition 
of this second type of commitment generates the 
possibility that trust and interdependence could have 
different impacts on affective commitment versus 
calculative commitment. Secondly, we propose that 
trust and interdependence will have an interactive 
effect on affective commitment. Finally, marketing 
theories frequently have been tested only in a single 
country, often the United States. It is not clear to 
what extent research findings and insights obtained 
in one particular country are applicable to other 
countries. As Cunningham and Green (1984), (p. 9) 
pointedly observe: "This  is essentially a question of 
external validity and research should be encouraged 
to determine which marketing principles can be uni- 
versally applied and which are basically ethnocen- 
tric". Therefore, we test the cross-national validity 
of our hypotheses with data from two countries, the 
United States and the Netherlands. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we 
discuss the construct of commitment, distinguishing 
between affective and calculative commitment. Next, 
we develop hypotheses about the impact of the chan- 
nel interdependence structure and trust on commit- 
ment. Then, we describe the research methodology 
and test our hypotheses on data collected from auto- 
mobile dealers in the United States and the Nether- 
lands. Finally, we discuss the limitations of our 
research and the implications of our findings. 
2. The  nature of c o m m i t m e n t  - affective commit-  
ment  and caiculative c o m m i t m e n t  
Commitment typically has been defined as a 
channel member's intention to continue the relation- 
ship (e.g., Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Dwyer et al., 
1987). Organizational researchers have noted, how- 
ever, that several different motivations can underlie 
this intention, and thus have identified various differ- 
ent types of commitment (Allen and Meyer, 1991). 
Of these, affective commitment and calculative com- 
mitment appear most frequently and also seem to be 
the most relevant for interorganizational relation- 
ships (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990). Both affective and 
calculative commitment are psychological states, i.e., 
relatively stable attitudes and beliefs about the rela- 
tionship that arise, at least in part, out of interaction 
(Huston and Robins, 1982), but they clearly arise 
from different motivations for maintaining a rela- 
tionship. 
Past channel studies, however, have usually fo- 
cused solely on affectively motivated commitment 
(e.g., Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Kumar et al., 
1995a; Kumar et al., 1995b; Morgan and Hunt, 
1994) where the underlying motive to maintain a 
channel relationship is a "generalized sense of posi- 
tive regard for, and attachment to, the organization" 
(Konovsky and Cropanzano, 1991, p. 699). Accord- 
ing to this view, an affectively committed channel 
member desires to continue its relationship because 
it likes the partner and enjoys the partnership 
(Buchanan, 1974). It experiences a sense of loyalty 
and belongingness (Jaros et al., 1993; Porter et al., 
1974). 
Calculative commitment, in contrast, is the extent 
to which channel members perceive the need to 
maintain a relationship given the significant antici- 
pated termination or switching costs associated with 
leaving. It results from a 'cold' calculation of costs 
and benefits, including an assessment of the invest- 
ments made in the relationship and the availability of 
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alternatives to replace or make up for the foregone 
investments (Allen and Meyer, 1991). As calculative 
commitment is based in the perceived structural con- 
straints that bind the firm to its channel partner, it 
reflects a rather negative motivation for continuing 
the relationship. ~ Despite the attention paid to the 
cons t ruc t  of  ca lcu la t ive  c o m m i t m e n t  in 
industrial/organizational psychology and organiza- 
tional behavior research (e.g., Mathieu and Zajac, 
1990; McGee and Ford, 1987), it has been virtually 
ignored in the channels literature. Although Ganesan 
(1994) examines 'commitment' ,  his operationaliza- 
tion is dominated by items reflecting the buyer's 
economic utility derived from a long relationship 
with its vendor. Buchanan (1992), on the other hand, 
does not empirically examine calculative commit- 
ment, but she suggests that a channel firm may have 
an incentive to make a commitment to the relation- 
ship because of the inherent value of its partner's 
resources. Only Kumar et al. (1994) in a working 
paper have explicitly distinguished between affective 
and calculative commitment in both theory and mea- 
sures. 
The organizational behavior literature has typi- 
cally conceptualized affective commitment and cal- 
culative commitment as being independent; the ex- 
tent to which one is affectively committed does not 
affect the degree of calculative commitment, and 
vice versa (e.g., Allen and Meyer, 1991; McGee and 
Ford, 1987). If this is true, the use of global commit- 
ment measures - which measure intention to con- 
tinue a relationship without consideration of the un- 
derlying motivation - could confound or mask dif- 
ferent, and possibly even opposite effects on affec- 
tire commitment versus calculative commitment. 
Calculative commitment  is an attitudinal phenomenon as it 
measures the degree to which a firm experiences a need to 
continue a channel relationship due to the high costs of leaving. 
As such, calculative commitment  distinctly differs from depen- 
dence, which refers to the structure of the relationship. Whereas 
dependence measures structural elements that bind the firm to the 
panner,  calculative commitment  measures to what extent the 
f i rm's  motit,ation to continue the relationship with that partner is 
based on these structural ties. Our data provide evidence that a 
f i rm's  calculative commitment  and its dependence on the channel 
partner are distinct constructs; correlations between these con- 
structs were 0.338 (the Netherlands) and 0.263 (the United States). 
Furthermore, the use of the more general term 'com- 
mitment' to describe either of these two very differ- 
ent facets creates considerable confusion in the inter- 
pretation of commitment theories, models and empir- 
ical findings. As calculative and affective commit- 
ment are distinctly different in nature, interdepen- 
dence structure and trust could have differential ef- 
fects on these facets. 
3. The effects of  interdependence on affective and 
calculative commitment  
Since marketing channels are defined as sets of 
interdependent organizations involved in the process 
of making a product or service available for use or 
consumption (Stern and E1-Ansary, 1992), interde- 
pendence is a crucial concept in marketing channels 
research. Channels researchers have often derived 
their definitions of dependence from the Emerson 
(1962) conceptualization of power-dependence the- 
ory; each party's dependence on its partner is deter- 
mined by (1) its motivational investment in the 
relationship, and (2) the replaceability of the partner. 
Motivational investment refers to the value of the 
resources or outcomes mediated by the other party. 
This aspect of dependence has often been opera- 
tionalized via the 'sales and profits' approach (E1- 
Ansary and Stern, 1972); the greater the sales and 
profits that the channel partner accounts for, the 
greater the channel member's dependence on its 
partner (e.g., Frazier et al., 1989; Frazier and Rody, 
1991). The replaceability component of dependence 
refers to the difficulty of replacing one's channel 
partner because of switching costs or the lack of 
alternative partners (e.g., Buchanan, 1992); the more 
difficult it is to replace a partner, the greater is the 
channel member's dependence on that partner. Fol- 
lowing Emerson's conceptualization, an assessment 
of a firm's dependence should encompass both moti- 
vational investment and replaceability. 
In contrast to early research on channel depen- 
dence that focused on the effects of a firm's absolute 
dependence on its partner without reference to its 
partner's dependence, recent studies have incorpo- 
rated both firms' dependence (e.g., Buchanan, 1992; 
Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994; Kumar et al., 1995b). 
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Various researchers have recently argued that a com- 
prehensive view of the channel interdependence 
structure must include both total interdependence 
and interdependence asymmetry (Gundlach and 
Cadotte, 1994; Kumar et al., 1995b). Total interde- 
pendence refers to the sum of each firm's depen- 
dence on its partner; this value is an assessment of 
what Emerson (1972) terms 'relational cohesion'. 
Interdependence asymmetry refers to the difference 
between the firm's dependence on its partner and the 
partner's dependence on the firm. Symmetric inter- 
dependence exists when the parties are equally de- 
pendent on each other. 
The various elements of the channel interdepen- 
dence structure can have diverse effects on the chan- 
nel members' attitudes and behavior (Gundlach and 
Cadotte, 1994; Kumar et al., 1995b). We posit that 
total interdependence and interdependence asymme- 
try will have divergent effects on affective and calcu- 
lative commitment. 
3.1. Total interdependence 
The Dwyer et al. (1987) model of relationship 
development highlights a process of gradual expan- 
sion of interdependence between buyer and seller. To 
arrive at a state of high interdependence, i.e., a state 
in which both buyer and seller dependence are high, 
partners must go through a number of relationship 
development phases in which they continually en- 
large the investments they make in one another, in 
order to demonstrate and signal their good faith 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Johanson and Mattson, 
1985). If one of the channel members is not satisfied 
with the relationship, it will not have its own posi- 
tion 'weakened' by investing in the other partner. 
Therefore, all else being equal, increasing total inter- 
dependence demonstrates to a channel member that 
efforts to maintain the relationship are reciprocated 
by its partner (Anderson and Weitz, 1992), that 
partners adapt to fit each other better (Hall6n et al., 
1991), that the proportion of common to competitive 
interests increases (Kumar et al., 1995b), and that 
customer/seller loyalty is achieved (Dwyer et al., 
1987). These converging interests lead us to propose 
that high total interdependence causes channel mem- 
bers to prefer their relationship to continue |or affec- 
tive reasons. Evidence for the effect of total interde- 
pendence on affective commitment has been pro- 
vided by Kumar et al. (1995b) for dependence con- 
ceptualized as replaceability. We seek to corroborate 
their findings for a broader conceptualization of de- 
pendence, encompassing both motivational invest- 
ment and replaceability, and hypothesize: 2 
HI. Greater total interdependence leads to higher 
affective commitment for both channel firms. 
Ties of total interdependence provide each party 
in the relationship with the opportunity to facilitate 
the other's goal attainment. More highly interdepen- 
dent firms have more to lose if the partnership ends, 
as they have made a lot of idiosyncratic investments 
in the relationship (Dwyer et al., 1987). Hence, it 
would be contrary to the self-interest of those chan- 
nel members to end their relationship, as they have 
much to lose. We expect, therefore, that when total 
interdependence increases, each firm's necessity to 
continue the relationship will increase too, because 
firms have created mutual exit barriers (Anderson 
and Weitz, 1992). Therefore: 
H2. Greater total interdependence leads to higher 
calculative commitment for both channel firms. 
3.2. Interdependence asymmetry 
Recently, the consequences of interdependence 
asymmetry have become a major theme of research 
in the marketing channels literature (e.g., Anderson 
and Weitz, 1989; Kumar et al., 1995b). These re- 
searchers have consistently argued that channel rela- 
tionships with more asymmetric interdependence are 
more dysfunctional because of the exploitation op- 
portunities that result from the imbalance. Essentially 
the same rationale explains the negative effect of 
interdependence asymmetry on affective commit- 
ment. Greater interdependence asymmetry is likely 
to reduce each firm's affective commitment, because 
the disparity in their dependence will tend to put 
their interests in conflict. A deeper understanding of 
-~ All stated hypotheses are based on the assumption of 'all  else 
being equal ' .  
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this negative relationship requires distinguishing be- 
tween the more and the less dependent channel 
member. 
For the less dependent partner, having relative 
power over its weaker partner makes it likely this 
power will be used to achieve the partner's coopera- 
tion and to obtain valuable outcomes. The stronger 
firm has little structural motivation to identify with 
or become attached to the weaker partner (Kumar et 
al., 1995b; Robicheaux and E1-Ansary, 1975). For 
the more dependent party, its fear of exploitation 
reduces its satisfaction with the relationship (Ander- 
son and Narus, 1984) and consequently also its 
motivation to continue the relationship for affective 
reasons (Anderson and Weitz, 1989). In line with 
these studies, we hypothesize: 
H3. Greater interdependence asymmetry decreases 
affective commitment for both channel firms. 
For calculative commitment, the picture is differ- 
ent. Calculative commitment is based on an eco- 
nomic rationale; a firm is motivated to stay with its 
partner because it needs to from an economic point 
of view. For the less dependent channel member, as 
interdependence asymmetry increases, its power ad- 
vantage over its partner increases. The less depen- 
dent firm thus has lower need to continue the rela- 
tionship, although it may well intend to do so be- 
cause of its ability to achieve its goals through its 
dominance over the partner. Thus the less dependent 
firm's calculative commitment will be reduced as the 
interdependence asymmetry increases. 
On the other hand, the more dependent firm's 
calculative commitment is expected to increase as 
the interdependence asymmetry increases. As its rel- 
ative dependence on the more powerful partner be- 
comes greater, the less dependent firm is in an 
increasingly vulnerable position. Hence, we expect 
that the weaker firm will be motivated to continue 
the relationship because it is the necessar3' thing to 
do, given the high perceived switching costs. We 
thus propose a positive relationship between interde- 
pendence asymmetry and calculative commitment 
for the more dependent firm and hypothesize: 
H4. Greater interdependence asymmetry increases 
calculative commitment for the more dependent 
channel partner, but decreases calculative commit- 
ment for the less dependent firm. 
4. The effects of trust on affective and calculative 
commitment  
The centrality of trust in developing long-term 
relationships has been emphasized repeatedly in the 
marketing channels literature (e.g., Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989; Dwyer et al., 1987; Morgan and Hunt, 
1994). In social psychology, a consensus seems to be 
emerging that trust encompasses two essential ele- 
ments - trust in the partner's honesty and trust in the 
partner's benevolence (e.g., Larzelere and Huston, 
1980; Rempel et al., 1985). Each of these dimen- 
sions has been examined at times by channels re- 
searchers. Honesty refers to the belief that one's 
partner stands by its word, fulfills promised role 
obligations, and is sincere (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; 
Scheer and Stern, 1992); benevolence reflects the 
belief that one's partner is interested in the firm's 
welfare and will not take unexpected actions which 
will negatively impact the firm (Anderson and Narus, 
1990; Anderson and Weitz, 1989). Trust, therefore, 
exists to the extent that the channel member believes 
its partner to be honest and benevolent. 
In examining the effects of trust on commitment, 
we extend previous research by (1) exploring the 
differential effects of trust on affective and calcula- 
tive commitment, and (2) considering how the ef- 
fects of dependence asymmetry on commitment are 
moderated by trust. 
4.1. The main effects of trust 
Trust, as well as the process of interfirm adapta- 
tions and interorganizational learning by which trust 
is built, are so highly valued in interfirm relation- 
ships that parties will strongly desire to continue 
these relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Hall6n et al., 
1991). Empirical support for the positive main effect 
of trust on affective commitment has been provided 
in marketing channels by Anderson and Weitz (1989) 
and Morgan and Hunt (1994). Although these studies 
both refer to global 'commitment' ,  their operational- 
izations reflect primarily affective commitment. Con- 
sistent with these studies, we hypothesize that the 
higher a firm's trust in its partner, the higher its 
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motivation to continue the relationship for affective 
reasons: 
H5. Higher trust increases affective commitment 
for both channel partners. 
Trust reflects a firm's confidence, positive expec- 
tations and attributions that its partner is honest and 
responsive to the firm's needs (Rempel et al., 1985). 
Holmes and Rempel (1989) report that high-trust 
parties maintained positive feelings toward their 
partners by discounting negative elements in ways 
that confirmed their positive trusting attitudes. Trust- 
ing individuals did not naively ignore negative ele- 
ments in relationship issues, but they made fewer 
negative attributions. 
The tenor of a distrusting relationship is quite 
different. When trust is low, firms are more likely to 
carefully scrutinize and monitor the other partner's 
behavior, to guard against the partner's opportunism, 
and to incur various costs of such vigilance. When 
trust is low, therefore, decisions as to whether to 
maintain the relationship are more likely to be based 
on a calculation of immediate benefits versus costs. 
A channel member who intends to continue the 
relationship is more likely to be motivated to do so 
because it cannot easily replace its current partner 
and obtain the same resources and outcomes outside 
its current relationship. We therefore posit that as a 
firm's trust in its partner decreases, it is more likely 
to perceive that it needs to continue the relationship 
rather than that it wants to maintain the relationship. 
We hypothesize: 
H6. Higher trust decreases calculative commitment 
for both channel partners. 
4.2. Interactive effect of trust and interdependence 
asymmetry on affectiue commitment 
In the channels literature, the potential exploita- 
tion of the more dependent partner by the less depen- 
dent partner has consistently been advanced as the 
primary reason for the anticipated negative effects of 
interdependence asymmetry on affective commit- 
ment. When faced with an asymmetric relationship, 
negative feelings toward the partner are likely to 
prevail and, consequently, affective commitment de- 
creases (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Anderson and 
Narus, 1990; Kumar et al., 1995b). 
We agree that exploitation, when it occurs, has a 
devastating effect on affective commitment. How- 
ever, we do not concur with the implicit assumption 
that exploitation is an inherent human characteristic, 
surfacing whenever it is unchecked by governance 
modes. A state of high interdependence asymmetry 
certainly creates the potential for exploitation, as the 
less dependent partner faces temptation to exploit its 
power advantage while the relatively dependent part- 
ner endures the fear of being exploited. But interde- 
pendence asymmetry does not, in and of itself, in- 
evitably result in the realization of exploitation. We 
submit that trust can impede such exploitation and 
consequently moderate the negative effect of interde- 
pendence asymmetry on affective commitment. 
The relatively powerful (less dependent) channel 
member could use coercive, negative types of power 
to achieve immediate compliance or, alternatively, 
could exercise more positive, constructive types of 
influence to build and deepen the relationship with 
the objective of greater long term cooperation. When 
the relatively powerful firm refrains from exploiting 
its structural power advantage, the relatively depen- 
dent channel member may interpret this as a signal 
that its dominant partner intends to work together to 
promote joint goals over the long run (Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989; Molto, 1981). By disdaining negative 
power use in favor of more constructive power use, 
the more powerful firm can both convey its trust in 
the weaker partner and also attempt to build the 
partner's trust in the firm. 
When the relatively dependent firm trusts in the 
dominant partner's honesty and benevolence 
(Larzelere and Huston, 1980; Rempel et al., 1985), it 
attributes cooperative and sincere intentions to its 
partner. Consequently, its fear of exploitation and the 
resulting feelings of uncertainty are reduced. The 
weak channel member is most likely to trust the 
relatively powerful partner when it perceives that the 
dominant partner uses its power constructively to 
promote joint interests and collective goals (Dwyer 
et al., 1987) and to improve channel performance 
and satisfaction for both partners (Robicheaux and 
EI-Ansary, 1975). When a relatively powerful firm 
can trust its weaker partner's honesty and coopera- 
tive intentions, it has ample reason to forsake the 
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opportunity to exploit this weaker partner (Molm, 
1981). Trust results in lower conflict and higher 
satisfaction (Anderson and Narus, 1990), better per- 
sonal relations (H~tkansson and Johanson, 1988), and 
a beneficial reputation (Granovetter, 1985), as com- 
pared to the use of coercive and expioitative prac- 
tices to achieve desired outcomes. 
Consequently, for both the less dependent firm 
and the more dependent firm, higher trust will reduce 
the negative impact of interdependence asymmetry 
on affective commitment. We therefore propose an 
interaction effect between trust and dependence 
asymmetry. 
H7. For both channel partners, the negative effects 
of interdependence asymmetry on affective commit- 
ment are mitigated by trust. 
5. Method 
5.1. Sample and data collection procedure 
As firms grow increasingly international in char- 
acter, the need to establish cross-cultural validity of 
theoretical models of marketing channel relation- 
ships becomes more germane (Cunningham and 
Green, 1984; Frazier et al., 1989). We collected data 
from two different countries, namely the United 
States and the Netherlands. We concentrated on 
dealers' commitment to their supplier and the role of 
their perceptions of interdependence structure and 
trust in shaping this commitment. The samples were 
drawn from lists of automobile dealers that were 
purchased from commercial sources in the two coun- 
tries. 
In the United States the list of 2100 new car 
dealers was reduced by deleting duplicate listings 
and those dealers for whom no contact name was 
available. Surveys with personalized cover letters 
were mailed to 1640 automobile dealers with follow- 
up letters to nonrespondents four weeks later. Ques- 
tionnaires were received from 453 automobile deal- 
ers, a response rate of 28%. After elimination of 
questionnaires from which excessive amounts of data 
were missing, the final U.S. sample consisted of 417 
dealers. 
In the Netherlands, the questionnaire was mailed 
to a random sample of 1600 dealers drawn from a 
list 4000 new car dealers representing the entire 
country. As no contact name was available for these 
dealers, cover letters were not personalized. Further- 
more, because of resource limitations, no follow-up 
letters to nonrespondents were mailed. These factors 
lowered our response to 19% with 309 question- 
naires returned. After elimination of questionnaires 
from which excessive amounts of data were missing, 
the final Dutch sample consisted of 289 dealers. Our 
response rates of 28 and 19 percent are within the 
range typically reported for channel studies. Using 
the Armstrong and Overton (1977) procedure, no 
significant differences ( p > 0 . 1 0 )  were found be- 
tween early and late respondents on any of our 
constructs, nor on other variables such as the number 
of makes of new cars carried by the dealer. Thus, 
nonresponse bias appears not to be a problem. 
Dealers in both countries were asked to report on 
the automobile supplier (usually the manufacturer for 
the U.S. dealers and an automobile importer for the 
Dutch dealers) whose product line accounted for the 
largest share of their firm's sales. Telephone calls 
were made to a subset of the dealers to ensure that 
the informant was the person in the organization who 
most frequently interacted with the supplier and con- 
sequently was the most knowledgeable about the 
relationship with the supplier. These confirmations 
and an examination of the titles held by the infor- 
mants (President, Owner, General Manager, or some 
combination thereof) suggest that our informants 
were competent. 
5.2. Measure deL, elopment 
Commitment. Affective and calculative commit- 
ment were each measured by three items based on 
the construct definitions and scales from Kumar et 
al. (1994). The measures use a seven-point Likert 
type response format. Affective commitment items 
tap the degree to which a dealer is motivated to 
continue the relationship with its supplier out of 
affective reasons. The set of calculative commitment 
items reflect the extent to which a dealer's motiva- 
tion to continue the relationship is based on high 
perceived losses in case the relationship would end. 
Both affective commitment (ACOM) and calculative 
commitment (CCOM) construct scores were com- 
puted by averaging the item scores, hence ensuring 
that both construct scores range between 1 and 7. 
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Trust. Trust exists when a finn believes its partner 
is honest and benevolent (Larzelere and Huston, 
1980; Rempel et al., 1985). Trust in the supplier's 
honesty was measured by five items assessing the 
extent to which the supplier is honest, truthful, and 
keeps its promises. A five item supplier benevolence 
scale captured the dealer's belief that the supplier 
considers the dealer's interests or welfare. The 
lower-level constructs of honesty and benevolence 
were equally weighted to create a composite score 
for trust (TRUST) ranging between 1 and 7. 
Interdependence. Dealer dependence and dealer's 
perception of supplier dependence were measured by 
six items each. Measuring the dealer's perception of 
the interdependence structure was consistent with 
our examination of the antecedents of the dealer's 
commitment to the relationship, which is affected by 
how the dealer perceives the interdependence struc- 
ture. 
Conforming to the Emerson (1962) conceptualiza- 
tion of dependence, we included both motivational 
investment and replaceability. The reseller's motiva- 
tional investment was measured using three items 
which assessed the percentage of sales and profits 
the supplier's line provides and how important the 
relationship is to achievement of the reseller's goals. 
The dealer's perception of the supplier's motiva- 
tional investment was similarly measured by three 
items except that, following Frazier and Rody (1991), 
the profit item was replaced by an item assessing 
how important the supplier considers the reseller's 
territory. Thus, our motivational investment facet 
scales combined adaptations of the Frazier and Rody 
(1991) sales and profit index with the E1-Ansary and 
Stern (1972) measure. The items that assessed per- 
centages of sales and/or  profits accounted for by the 
partner, were converted to seven-point scales (cfr. 
Frazier and Rody, 1991). The dealer's perception of 
its own replaceability and its supplier's replaceability 
each were measured using three parallel items 
adapted from the Heide and John (1988) replaceabil- 
ity scale. These items capture the opportunity costs 
of the value that would be lost if the relationship 
ended and the switching costs associated with termi- 
nation and replacement. 
Following precedent (Frazier et al., 1989; Frazier 
and Rody, 1991) as well as the argument of Heide 
and John (1988) that different measures of depen- 
dence such as concentration of exchange and re- 
placeability may not covary because they assess 
different aspects of dependence, we conceptualized 
dependence as a multidimensional composite index 
(Bollen and Lennox, 1991; Howell, 1987). Consis- 
tent with how such formative indicators are inter- 
preted (Bollen and Lennox, 1991), it is posited that 
our dependence items result in dependence rather 
than vice versa. For example, we assert that depen- 
dence is high when it is difficult to replace the sales 
from a relationship and/or  when a high percentage 
of sales are accounted for by the relationship, but we 
do not expect the converse (e.g., that an increase in 
dependence causes a high percentage of sales to be 
accounted for by the relationship). Because depen- 
dence can be created in various alternative ways that 
are captured by our items, we do not anticipate that 
an increase in dependence will require a simultane- 
ous increase in all items. As Bollen and Lennox 
(1991) note, internal consistency is not a criterion for 
assessing the validity of such multi-dimensional 
composites, but rather " to  assess validity we need to 
examine other variables that are effects of the latent 
construct" (p. 312). Support for our hypotheses or 
nomological validity will provide substantial evi- 
dence of the validity of our dependence measures. 
Supplier dependence and dealer dependence scores 
were computed by averaging the corresponding mo- 
tivational investment and availability of alternatives 
scores, again ensuring that all construct scores ranged 
between 1 and 7. 
Our measure of total interdependence (INTER- 
DEP) was constructed by summing dealer depen- 
dence and supplier dependence scores. Interdepen- 
dence asymmetry (ASYMTRY) was calculated as the 
absolute value of the difference between supplier and 
dealer dependence. 
Table 1 shows sample items for all the measures 
used in the study, as well as the Cronbach alpha 
reliabilities of the measures in both countries. 
5.3. Measure validation 
Consistent with our conceptualization, trust was 
specified as a two-factor model. The fit for each 
country was good. The overall fit indices for the 
Netherlands were: ×2(34)= 73.24, Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI)---0.972, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)= 
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Table 2 
Regression results for calculative commitment 
Independent variables Netherlands United States 
b (t-value) 1~ b (t-value) 
Intercept 4.300 (50.085) a 0.000 4.349 (56.373) ~ 
INTERDEP 0.358 (5.358) a 0.325 0.212 (4.112) " 
ASYMTRY * D1 -0.478 (-2.314) b -0.129 -0.434 (-2.099) b 
ASYMTRY * D2 0.342 (2.150) b 0.120 0.356 (3.761) a 
TRUST -0.173 (-1.970) b -0.120 -0.547 (-8.737) a 
R 2 0.12 0.21 
E(n, m) (4,284) = 9.458 (4, 412) = 26.591 
0.000 
0.193 
-0.093 
0.170 
-0.407 
Significant at p < 0.01 (one-tailed test). 
b Significant at p < 0.05 (one-tailed test). 
c Significant at p < 0.10 (one-tailed test). 
0.962, root mean square error of  approximation 
( R M S E A )  = 0.063, and for the United States were: 
×2(34) = 159.58, C F I  = 0.954, TLI  = 0.940, R M -  
SEA  = 0.094. All factor loadings were highly signifi- 
cant (minimum t-value was 6.9) and exceeded the 
0.4 level commonly considered meaningful in 
factor-analytic investigations (Ford et al., 1986). 
These findings support the convergent validity of  the 
items (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). For  both coun- 
tries, the correlation coefficient between benevolence 
and honesty was significantly below unity ( p  < 
0.0001) which supports the discriminant validity of 
the two factors. The cross-national equivalence was 
further tested by specifying a two-country model in 
which the pattern of  fixed and free parameters is the 
same in both countries (Bagozzi  and Yi, 1988). The 
fit of  this model was also very good: × 2 ( 6 8 ) =  
232.85, C F I  = 0.933, TLI  = 0.947, R M S E A  = 0.059. 
To provide a stringent test of  our measurement 
models for affective and calculative commitment,  all 
six commitment  items were evaluated in a single 
two-factor model. The national-level analysis indi- 
cated a good fit for each country; the Netherlands: 
×2(8) = 16.86, C F I  = 0.985, TLI  = 0.971, R M S E A  
= 0.062, United States: X2(8) = 24.22, C F I  = 0.984, 
TLI  = 0.970, R M S E A  = 0.070. All  items loaded sig- 
nificantly on their hypothesized factor (minimum 
t-value was 10.1), and all loadings exceeded 0.6. The 
correlation between affective and calculative com- 
mitment was significantly below unity ( p  < 0.0001) 
in both countries. The two-country model, specifying 
the same pattern in both countries also yielded a 
good fit: ×2(16) = 41.08, C F I  = 0.984, TLI  = 0.971, 
R M S E A  =0 .047 .  In sum, the national-level and 
cross-national level analyses indicate a high level of  
cross-national equivalence at the measurement level 
for trust, affective commitment  and calculative com- 
mitment. Hence, we can examine relations among 
them in cross-cultural research (Triandis, 1982). 
5.4. Resu l t s  
The effects of  dependence structure and trust on 
calculative and affective commitment  were tested by 
estimating the following two equations: 
C C O M  = a o + a 1 1 N T E R D E P  + a 2 A S Y M T R Y  * D1 
+ a 3 A S Y M T R Y  * D 2  + a 4 T R U S T ,  
A C O M  = b o + b 1 1 N T E R D E P  + b 2 A S Y M T R Y  
+ b 3 T R U S T  + b 4 A S Y M T R Y  * T R U S T ,  
where D1 = 1, if supplier dependence exceeds dealer 
dependence; 0, otherwise. D 2  = 1, if dealer depen- 
dence exceeds supplier dependence; 0, otherwise. 
The dummy variables D I  and D2 differentiate 
between those asymmetric relationships where the 
supplier is in a position of  relative dependence ( D 1  
= 1) versus those where the dealer is relatively 
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Table 3 
Regression results for affective commitment 
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Independent variables Netherlands United States 
b (t-value) [3 b (t-value) 
Intercept 5.039 (94.035) " 0.000 5.207 (117.728) ~ 
INTERDEP 0.085 (2.039) b 0.096 0.109 (3.601) ~ 
ASYMTRY 0.067 (0.881) 0.038 0.097 (1.969) b 
TRUST 0.712 (12.916) a 0.610 0.811 (21.774) a 
A S Y M T R Y  * TRUST 0.223 (3.237) ~ 0.142 0.047 (t.343) ~ 
R 2 0.47 0.60 
F(n,  m) (4,284) = 62,628 (4,412) = 153.304 
0.000 
0.120 
0.064 
0.728 
0.043 
" Significant at p < 0.01 (one-tailed test). 
h Significant at p < 0.05 (one-tailed test). 
c Significant at p < 0.10 (one-tailed test). 
dependent  on the supplier  ( D 2  = 1). 3 As error resid- 
uals f rom separate OLS regressions were  found to be 
uncorrelated,  each equat ion was es t imated sepa- 
rately, using OLS.  4 The data f rom the Uni ted States 
and the Nether lands  were  kept separate to examine  
the cross-cul tural  general izabi l i ty  o f  our  findings. 
The results are reported in Table  2 for  calcula t ive  
c o m m i t m e n t  and in Table  3 for affect ive  commi t -  
ment.  
The  results for ca lcula t ive  c o m m i t m e n t  indicate 
support  for all of  our  hypotheses  concern ing  the 
effects  o f  trust and in te rdependence  structure on 
ca icula t ive  c o m m i t m e n t  for both countries.  Calcula-  
t ive c o m m i t m e n t  is greater  when total interdepen-  
3 Note that in the equation for affective commitment, the 
dummy variables DI  and D2 do not appear. Since asymmetry is 
operationalized as the absolute calue of the difference between 
supplier and dealer dependence, this implies that we assume that 
the effects of A S Y M T R Y  and A S Y M T R Y ~  TRUST on affective 
commitment do not differ between relatively dependent and rela- 
tively powerful dealers. This is consistent with the theory section 
in which no differential relations are hypothesized. To examine 
whether this assumption held true, we estimated a model in which 
we analyzed the effect of interdependence asymmetry for rela- 
tively dependent versus relatively powerful dealers. Four new 
variables were created by multiplying A S Y M T R Y  and 
A S Y M T R Y  * TRUST by DI and D2. No significant difference 
(p > 0.20) was found between the regression coefficients for 
D I  * A S Y M T R Y  and D2 * A S Y M T R Y  nor between 
DI * A S Y M T R Y  * TRUST and D2 * A S Y M T R Y  * TRUST. 
4 The data were mean centered to reduce multicollinearity 
(Jaccard et al., 1991). 
dence is higher,  support ing H2. When  asymmet ry  
increases,  calcula t ive  c o m m i t m e n t  decreases  for the 
less dependent  party, and increases for the more 
dependent  channel  m e m b e r  (H4). Further, trust in the 
supplier  negat ively  impacts  a dea le r ' s  calcula t ive  
c o m m i t m e n t  (H6). 5 
The results also indicate that affect ive  commi t -  
ment  is h igher  when total in terdependence  is greater, 
consistent  with HI .  Increasing trust posi t ively  im- 
pacts affect ive  c o m m i t m e n t  (H5). Whereas  the sig- 
nif icant  posi t ive interaction effect  be tween  interde- 
pendence  asymmet ry  and trust supports H7, contrary 
to H3 no negat ive  effect  of  dependence  asymmet ry  
on affect ive c o m m i t m e n t  is observed.  Though  inter- 
dependence  asymmet ry  was signif icantly related to 
affect ive  c o m m i t m e n t  in the Uni ted  States, the result  
was opposi te  the predicted direct ion (b  = 0.097; p = 
0.025). Also  for the Netherlands,  a small posi t ive,  
though not significant,  ef fect  o f  asymmet ry  on affec- 
tive commi tmen t  was found (b  = 0.067; p = 0.19). 
6. Discussion 
This study examined  the jo int  impact  of  the 
dea le r ' s  percept ions of  the channel  in terdependence  
For calculative commitment, no interaction effect between 
trust and interdependence asymmetry was hypothesized. An addi- 
tional model was estimated including this interaction effect. Con- 
sistent with our expectations, no significant interaction was found 
in either country. 
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structure and its trust in the supplier on affective and 
calculative commitment. Previous research suggests 
that a channel member's commitment increases when 
total interdependence and trust increase and when 
interdependence asymmetry decreases (Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989; Ganesan, 1994; Kumar et al., 1995b). 
Our results confirm that these are major factors 
affecting relationship commitment. However, we ad- 
vance this literature and extend previous research by 
demonstrating that, depending on the type of com- 
mitment examined, the magnitude and the direction 
of the effects of trust and interdependence structure 
differ. Calculative commitment is affected more 
strongly by the interdependence structure of the rela- 
tionship than is affective commitment, while trust 
has a stronger effect on affective commitment than 
on calculative commitment. 
Theoretical implications. Our findings suggest that 
deepening interdependence within a channel relation- 
ship will, by its very nature, tend to increase the 
calculative commitment of both parties. The extent 
to which this preoccupation with the somewhat nega- 
tive, calculative motivation for relationship continua- 
tion is supplanted by the more positively oriented 
affective commitment depends on whether or not 
trust exists between the parties. Trust can lead even 
highly interdependent finns to focus less on calcula- 
tive motivations and emphasize the desire to main- 
tain the relationship because of identification with 
and attachment to the partner. In the absence of trust, 
affective commitment is highly unlikely, but whether 
or not calculative commitment develops depends on 
the interdependence structure. 
In relationships characterized by asymmetric in- 
terdependence, greater asymmetry is associated with 
increased calculative commitment by the more de- 
pendent partner and less calculative commitment by 
the less dependent firm. As a firm's relative depen- 
dence increases, it has greater need to maintain the 
relationship; as a firm's relative power increases, this 
necessity is lower. So, in the absence of trust, the 
relatively powerful firm in a highly asymmetric 
channel relationship would be expected to exhibit 
relatively low levels of both affective commitment 
and calculative commitment. This implies that this 
less dependent firm has other motivations for its 
continuance of the relationship such as, for example, 
the awareness that it can use its relative power to 
achieve its strategic goals. Other researchers have 
argued that additional types of commitment beyond 
affective and calculative commitment exist (e.g., 
Allen and Meyer, 1991; Kumar et al., 1994). Future 
research could examine what other types of motiva- 
tion, if any, come into play when neither calculative 
commitment nor affective commitment is strong. 
Our most surprising finding is that, contrary to 
our expectation, interdependence asymmetry did not 
have a negative impact on affective commitment. 
Our findings suggest that asymmetry can have a 
small positive effect on affective commitment; also, 
asymmetry and trust have a positive interactive ef- 
fect on affective commitment. This positive relation- 
ship between interdependence asymmetry and affec- 
tive commitment seems somewhat curious, but it 
may be indirect evidence that interfirm power can 
play a positive role in promoting the effective coor- 
dination of channel relationships (e.g., Frazier and 
Rody, 1991; Scheer and Stern, 1992) for both the 
relatively powerful and the relatively dependent 
channel member (Blau, 1964). Frazier et al. (1989) 
argue that the more powerful partner does not need 
coercive strategies to obtain cooperation, but instead 
will rely on noncoercive strategies whenever possi- 
ble. As these are perceived as fairer by the weaker 
partner (Blau, 1964), a supportive exchange atmo- 
sphere leads to increased communication, greater 
agreement and value congruence (Tedeschi et al., 
1973) and, consequently, a sense of identification 
that contributes in important ways to a partner's 
motivation to continue the relationship for affective 
reasons (Kumar et al., 1994). Furthermore, 
Williamson (1975) has argued that in an imbalanced 
situation, ideology is often used as a unifying and 
cooperation-inducing force by the more powerful 
party. Future research is needed to examine the 
extent to which the more powerful firm's use of, or 
reluctance to use, various types of power function as 
mediating mechanisms through which interdepen- 
dence asymmetry has a positive effect on affective 
commitment. 
We advance the external validity of commitment 
studies by testing our hypotheses with data gathered 
from automobile dealers in two different countries 
and find strong evidence for the cross-national valid- 
ity of our measures and results. Despite the cultural 
differences and variations in sample composition, 
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competitive conditions, and legal environment be- 
tween the Netherlands and the United States, the 
effects of trust and interdependence structure on 
commitment are quite similar and always in the same 
direction for the two countries. This attests to the 
generalizability of our dyadic hypotheses over differ- 
ent external political economic structures. 
Managerial implications. When managers focus 
on altering the interdependence structure of their 
relationship, should they strive for affective commit- 
ment or for calculative commitment? Should they 
focus on managing the interdependence structure of 
their relationship, on increasing trust, or on both? 
Kumar et al. (1994) have argued that the conse- 
quences of affective commitment are superior to 
those for calculative commitment; affectively com- 
mitted channel members will invest more in the 
relationship, will perform at a significantly higher 
level and will be more resistant to opportunistic 
behavior. Therefore, given the choice between devel- 
oping closeness through affective versus through cal- 
culative commitment, those managing channel rela- 
tionships should strongly cultivate the former over 
the latter. Building trust should therefore be of higher 
importance than altering the dependence structure. 
Admittedly, trust is more easily developed in 
more highly interdependent, symmetric relationships 
(Kumar et al., 1995b), but our research suggests that 
working to develop trust, and actually achieving a 
trusting relationship, can pay handsome dividends 
regardless of the interdependence structure. Man- 
agers may worry too much about being dependent on 
another company. Provided they focus on developing 
trust, even asymmetrical relationships can be suc- 
cessful without being scary for the more dependent 
party. This is good news for all those in highly 
asymmetrical relationships. Dependence imbalances 
are of relatively minor importance if trust can be 
developed. 
Future research. Future research on the effects of 
trust and interdependence on commitment might ad- 
vance in several ways. First, consistent with the 
political economy approach, we focused on the 
dyadic relationship. However, network theorists (e.g., 
Johanson and Mattson, 1985; Hall~n et al., 1991) 
argue that it is useful to examine the position of 
firms in networks of exchange relationships in addi- 
tion to analyzing dyads. Future research could extend 
the present work on the effects of interdependence 
and trust on commitment to networks. Two poten- 
tially useful constructs that might be added as an- 
tecedents of commitment in networks are anticipated 
constructive effects on network identity and antici- 
pated deleterious effects on network identity (Ander- 
son et al., 1994). Second, we found that compared to 
affective commitment, trust and interdependence 
structure predict less variance in calculative commit- 
ment. Previous research indicated that trust and inter- 
dependence are two major antecedents of affective 
commitment. However, these variables predict less 
variance in calculative commitment, a construct 
which has hardly been researched in a channels 
context. This suggests that calculative commitment is 
also affected by other and, as yet, unknown vari- 
ables. Future research could explore other antecedent 
conditions of calculative commitment. Third, as there 
are two sides to a dyad, supplier commitment also 
deserves attention (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). In 
the future, researchers could address the extent to 
which dealer commitment and supplier commitment 
converge, and - in case of divergence - investigate 
the factors that cause the two channel members to be 
differentially committed to their relationship. Fourth, 
measures of total interdependence and interdepen- 
dence asymmetry were obtained from the dealer's 
side only. The supplier might have a different opin- 
ion regarding the interdependence structure of the 
relationship. While using dealer perceptions of inter- 
dependence is consistent with our goal to shed light 
on the dealer's motivation and commitment, addi- 
tional insight could be gained by exploring dyadic 
data. 
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